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INTRODUCTION 
A consensus has been growing in recent years that empirical legal 
scholarship is an important tool for informing policy decisions.1 Empirical 
study of legal concepts allows debate on fundamental questions that is 
informed by the actual impact of law on behavior rather than conjecture and 
an appeal to “common sense.”  But despite the recognition and broader 
acceptance of the benefits of empirical legal scholarship, many of the most 
fundamental concepts of law such as incentives, deterrence, and even 
justice, are not directly measurable and, therefore, have been overlooked in 
empirical study.  Fortunately, legal scholars can adopt the notion of 
construct validation---the way psychologists overcome the difficulty in 
measuring unobservable psychological phenomenon, called constructs---to 
develop empirical tests that measure these unobserved legal models and 
expand the current horizons of quantitative study of legal concepts. Using 
the meta-theories of construct validation, researchers can infer the effects of 
unobserved constructs and can thus modify foundational legal theories 
based on empirical evidence rather than speculation.  I propose a 
standardized procedure based on current understandings of construct 
validation that can be used to measure intangible legal constructs: 1) 
develop generalized legal theories, 2) infer hypotheses from those theories, 
3) design experiments to test the hypotheses, and 4) modify the general 
theories based on the research results. 
As a first step, researchers must develop theories about the effects of 
law that are specific enough to provide direction for empirical testing, while 
still taking a generalized perspective not confined to specific laws.  
Generalized theories are necessary to allow multiple inferences to be drawn 
that elucidate more detail of the unobserved latent variable being explored.  
For instance, rather than developing a theory only about the impact of the 
First Amendment, a more generalized theory will address the influences of 
all constitutional rights.  A generalized theory may state that populations 
tend to exhibit more freedom when specific rights are embedded within that 
nation’s constitution.  Empirical studies of freedom of speech can then 
provide particularized support for the broader constitutional theory, and can 
also interact with studies of other rights. 
 
1 See, e.g., Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top 
Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006) (“Empirical legal scholarship (ELS) is arguably the 
next big thing in legal intellectual thought.”); American Association of Law Schools 
Annual Meeting: Empirical Scholarship--What Should We Study and How Should We 
Study It? (Jan 3-7, 2006), available at http://www.aals.org/am2006/index.html; Lee Epstein 
& Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002); Richard H. 
McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction: Symposium: Empirical and Experimental 
Methods in Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 791. 
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Once a generalized theory has been devised, researchers can then 
infer sets of hypotheses to test measurable aspects of those theories.  For 
example, based on a theory that constitutional rights lead to more freedom, 
one might hypothesize that if a nation has a constitutional freedom of 
speech then the media may produce more commentary disapproving of the 
government.  While the actual freedom that the press feels is impossible to 
measure, the proportion of articles disapproving of government actions is 
relatively easily to calculate.  But a useful hypothesis suggests more than 
just an empirical test; it also should have the potential to undermine the 
theory.  The necessity for critical hypotheses is borne from the current 
philosophical understanding that theories can never be fully verified.  
Hence, while empirical evidence that sustains a theory can reaffirm the 
theory’s legitimacy, a critical hypothesis can serve one of two purposes: if 
supported, the hypothesis can undermine an incorrect theory, but if proven 
empirically inaccurate, that same hypothesis can help to rule out a potential 
a criticism.  By eliminating potential criticisms, a researcher can more 
forcefully demonstrate the validity of the overarching theory.2
Next, the research must devise experiments that can test the 
accuracy of the hypotheses.  Ideally, experiments would use randomized 
subjects for testing so that the results were likely caused by the treatment 
being studied rather than a bias in the selection process.  For instance, if a 
researcher wanted to study the effects on prison terms of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, the researcher would most like to randomly assign 
some convicted felons to be sentenced under the guidelines and an 
equivalent group to receive sentencing without using the guidelines.  But it 
is often not feasible to randomize subjects on empirical legal studies for 
practical, if not necessarily constitutional, reasons; most legal researchers, 
therefore, use various forms of quasi-experimentation that allow testing 
when subjects can not be randomized.  Quasi-experimental designs allow 
inferences to be made about causal relationships when randomization is not 
feasible.  The researcher wishing to study prison terms, for example, could 
use a “time-series design” to analyze sentences that were dolled out both 
before and after the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect.3 But because 
 
2 Moreover, a researcher should not test only one hypothesis because the results from that 
single test can be influenced by a questionable supporting theory rather than the one 
targeted by the study.  Each theory is supported by numerous auxiliary theories; for 
instance, many current economic theories of law are based on Ronald Coase’s famous 
theory of transactions, which in turn, relies in part on a rational-actor theory of behavior.  
Hence, a test of a single hypothesis concentrated on a prevailing theory of law and 
economics may uncover negative results, not because of a problem with the theory being 
examined, but because of problems with the rational-actor model.  But if only one 
hypothesis is tested, this possibility may not be recognized. 
3 Donald T. Campbell, et al., Quasi-Experimental Designs, in Methodology and 
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the experiment is not truly randomized, the researcher needs to be careful to 
identify plausible threats to internal validity (such as the possibility that 
other changes in the law during that same time period affected sentences).4
These threats can be controlled by adjusting design elements or statistical 
techniques to account for the threats.5 Finally, causal inferences can be 
made when the results form a coherent pattern, either within the study or as 
compared to outside knowledge.6
Once the various hypotheses have been tested, the overarching 
theory should be modified to reflect the new knowledge gained through the 
empirical data.  The theory may have accurately predicted all the results of 
the various experiments, in which case the theory is supported but no new 
information is provided to the field.  But if the theory’s predictions are not 
completely accurate, the theory should be modified to incorporate this new 
information.  Theories are not falsified every time disconfirming data is 
discovered, nor do fields go through seismic paradigm shifts where old 
theoretical frameworks are thrown out in favor of an entirely new system.  
Rather, through an iterative process of testing and retesting, theories about 
unobservable legal constructs can be modified based on inferences from the 
results of experimentation. 
It is important to note, however, that empirical quantitative analysis 
cannot supplant qualitative reasoning; while empirical results can help 
inform legal policy-making, it is still necessary to debate and understand 
theories on a qualitative level.  For example, empirical testing could 
indicate that torture could lead to improved intelligence gathering, but 
society must still decide whether it can morally justify such tactics.  
Similarly, evidence of the deterrent effect of capital punishment does not by 
itself substantiate the penalty.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Part II examines the 
development of philosophies of science to provide background of the 
current understandings of theory development.  Part III then describes the 
history of psychometrics to demonstrate how psychology has applied 
philosophies of science to overcome some of the same issues that empirical 
legal scholarship is now facing.  Finally, part IV details my proposed 
approach for incorporating the most relevant aspects of this related field 
into legal study.  
 
Epistemology for Social Science191, 201 (1988). 
4 William R. Shadish, The Empirical Program of Quasi-Experimentation, in Research 
Design: Donald Campbell’s Legacy 13, 16 (Leonard Bickman ed. 2000). 
5 Id. at 17. 
6 Id. at 18-19. 
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I. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Before moving on to describe a system for construct validation for 
legal studies, it is first necessary to understand the philosophical 
underpinnings on which those concepts are based. 
 
A.  Sir Karl Popper’s theory of verification and falsification 
 
A common starting point when addressing the philosophy of science 
is the philosopher Karl Popper’s idea of falsification; a theory is scientific if 
it can be tested and has the potential to be proven wrong.7 The central 
philosophical problem that concerned Popper was the difficulty of 
demarcation: how is science distinguishable from pseudo-science?  Popper 
concluded that a true scientific theory should be corroborated through 
exposure to empirical tests that have the potential of disproving the theory, 
and a theory is better corroborated when it has survived more difficult 
tests.8
Popper believed in an asymmetry between the ability to verify a 
theory and the ability to prove a theory false; specifically, a scientific theory 
can never be proven completely correct, but evidence that undermines a 
theory can conclusively prove that theory wrong.9 Even a well-established 
theory can be proven wrong at any time if contrary evidence is discovered.  
For instance, we may believe that every time an object is dropped it will fall 
towards the Earth, but even this theory could be falsified if the next item we 
drop fell up.  As a result, a hypothesis that can provide support for a theory 
is never as useful as one that can undermine the theory because the former 
can never prove a theory true, but the latter can definitively establish that it 
is false.  Scientists should concentrate, then, on testing negative hypotheses 
because each time a negative hypothesis fails, one more potential criticism 
has been ruled out and the theory has been further corroborated. 
But critics of this philosophy have pointed out that if this philosophy 
is correct, then history should be laden with critical studies that have 
falsified the predominant theory of the time.10 But, in fact, most important 
theories were falsified countless times before they were discarded.11 Under 
a falsificationist view, some of the most important theories in history were 
 
7 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Karl Popper et al. trans., 2002). 
8 Paul E. Meehl, Theoretical Risks and Tabular Astricks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the 
Slow Progress of Soft Psychology, in Selected Philosophical and Methodological Papers 1, 
18 (1991). 
9 Popper, supra note 7, at 18-19. 
10 Brendan Larvor, Lakatos: An Introduction 50 (1998). 
11 Id.
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not actually scientific.  Proponents of Popper’s philosophy, then, are forced 
to distort history and arbitrarily label certain falsifying experiments as 
“crucial,” while ignoring others.12 
Popper’s idea that a theory can be completely discredited by any 
negative evidence has been labeled a type of justificationism.13
Justificationists believe that a scientific theory can be fully proven by 
empirical evidence.14 “In brief, [justificationism] is the view that the way 
to criticize an idea is to see whether and how it can be justified.”15 
Justificationsists believe that certain facts exist and if scientists can 
establish that a particular theory does not reflect those facts, then the theory 
should be discarded.16 For example, the premise of an argument may be 
that all observable planets travel in an elliptical orbit, and the conclusion is 
that all planets must travel in an elliptical orbit.17 For a justifcationist, this is 
an invalid theory because it overstates the known facts.  But for a 
nonjustifcationist, the conclusion stated above may still have value to 
science as an unjustified hypothesis rather than as a justified statement 
about nature.  By reversing the syllogism, the conclusion can be a stated as 
a hypothesis, and the premises are data supporting the hypothesis.  Now, 
contrary evidence will not mean that the theory needs to be rejected 
outright, but may need to be conditionally rejected or revised to reflect the 
new data.18 This revision can proceed indefinitely as new information is 
collected.  Philosophy has generally moved away from the justificationist 
theories, and philosophers now endorse various versions of 
nonjustifactionism.19 
B.  Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Paradigm Shifts 
 
One such nonjustificationist theory is historian Thomas Kuhn’s 
theory of scientific paradigms.  After researching the history of scientific 
developments, Kuhn noted a distinction between mature and immature 
sciences.  In immature sciences, many competing schools of thought exist, 
but no single idea dominates the field.  Because an accepted theory has not 
been adopted, scientists operating in immature fields base their research on 
 
12 Id. at 42. 
13 William Warren Bartley, III, The Retreat to Commitment 104-05 (2d ed. 1984). 
14 Herbert Feigel & Albert Blumberg, Logical Positivism: A New European Movement, J. 
of Philosophy 28, 281-96 (1931). 
15 Bartley, supra note 13, at 186. 
16 Id., at 186-87. 
17 Id. at 191. 
18 Id. at 196. 
19 Greg Smith, On Construct Validity: Issues of Method and Measurement, 17 
Psychological Assessment 396 (2005); Bartley, supra, note 13, at 194. 
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many different schools of thought.  But in exchange for this freedom to 
choose their own theories, the scientists must give up the benefits from 
relying on established research supporting the broad theory.  Because no 
accepted idea for a field exists, the scientists must reassert every basic 
concept on which any new research relies.  For example, before a single 
concept for gravity was accepted, any publication of new research had to 
start with a thorough explanation of the scientist’s particular perspective on 
gravity and how those assumptions could affect the results.  Hence, an 
immature field moves along essentially at random because no controlling 
force exists to direct future exploration.  (This state of an immature field 
also seems to describe the current state of legal academics.  It is often 
necessary to spend a significant portion of a law review article stating the 
assumptions and background on which a new theory is based because, 
without it, a reader will not know what school of thought and definitions the 
author is employing). 
But researchers in an immature science do not need to despair that 
their field will flounder with no direction indefinitely; a science can mature, 
not necessarily because of a new field-shattering discovery, but from a 
theoretical proposal that is influential enough to persuade members of 
opposing schools of thought.  Once a controlling theory is accepted, mature 
fields are then guided and driven by this single idea.  For a new proposal to 
bring about maturity in a field, then, the new idea must also be open-ended 
enough so that future scientists have room to explore concepts controlled by 
the idea.  Kuhn labeled these driving forces “paradigms,” which specifically 
are “a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in 
their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications.”20 
Essentially, a paradigm is an accepted worldview or framework under 
which scientists explore their field.  In mature sciences, paradigms do not 
evolve slowly, but rather are subject to seismic transitions in thought, what 
Kuhn called paradigm shifts.21 When scientists go about their day-to-day 
work in a mature field they usually work within the dominant paradigm and 
engage in “normal science,” which is “research firmly based upon one or 
more past scientific achievements.”22 Most scientists in a field generally 
subscribe to the same general paradigm, and perform experiments to define 
the details of the paradigm.  As the scientists discover new information they 
adjust the prevailing theories to accommodate their results. 
 
20 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 43 (3d ed. 1996). 
21 Id. at 12-13.  Prior to Kuhn, the word “paradigm” had been used only in connection with 
grammar and linguistics.  Since Kuhn’s adoption of the word to science, however, the 
broader use of the word has become more prominently accepted. 
22 Id. at 10. 
7-Sep-06] Legal Construct Validation 8 
1. Normal science and the maturation of a field  
 
Kuhn described the development of electrical theory as a typical 
example of the maturation of a scientific field.  Until the mid-eighteenth 
century, the study of electricity floundered without a dominant paradigm.23 
Before that time scientists did not agree on a unifying concept for electricity 
and so each new experiment had to stand on its own accord without leaning 
on previous research for support.24 As is common in other immature fields, 
early researchers worked in one of many different schools of thought that 
described some of the known physical properties of electricity, such as the 
belief that electricity consisted of several different fluids, but no single view 
could completely explain all empirical observations.25 Without a dominant 
paradigm, facts could not be prioritized, evaluated, or criticized and 
physicists did not have a basis with which to devise future experiments.  
Development of the field proceeded with no direction and therefore 
discoveries were made slowly and essentially at random.26 But in the mid-
eighteenth century, Benjamin Franklin proposed that electricity may be a 
single fluid consisting of positive and negative charges.  Franklin’s theory 
could explain more characteristics of electricity than any other theory of the 
time, and it therefore grew to become widely accepted among other 
researchers.  It also suggested new avenues for future exploration and could 
therefore guide scientists to conduct experiments that would lead to more 
useful results.27 
Kuhn suggests that Franklin’s fluid-theory for electricity was the 
first dominant paradigm in the field.28 Once the paradigm was established, 
physicists no longer had to waste time reexamining the basics of electricity, 
and could begin to narrow their experiments to systematically explore the 
details of the paradigm.  Now that the field had matured, the scientists could 
engage in the “normal science” of the time.  Some of the discoveries by 
eighteenth-century physicists could have been made only by operating 
within this paradigm. 
Kuhn postulated that each new fact uncovered through normal 
science that supports the prevailing paradigm makes it more likely that 
theory is correct.  “Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or 
 
23 Id. at 12-13.  Other examples of paradigmatic works are Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s 
Almagest, Newton’s Principia and Opticks, Lavoiser’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s Geology.
24 Id. at 13. 
25 Franklin theorized that electricity was a fluid that operated differently under different 
pressures.  He said that electrical fluid under one level of pressure was “positive” and under 
another was “negative.” 
26 Kuhn, supra note 20, at 16. 
27 Id.
28 Id. at 18. 
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theory and, when successful, finds none.”29 As scientists continue to 
engage in normal science, however, they may encounter anomalous results 
that cannot be explained using the theories of the current paradigm.  The 
positive results are like a weight on a scale in favor of the existing 
paradigm, and the negative results act like counterweights against the 
existing paradigm.  Kuhn argued that once an anomaly is uncovered, 
scientists explore the anomaly.  As more becomes known about the odd 
event, researchers modify the existing theories to account for the new 
information.  Eventually, the anomaly will become a predictable part of the 
current paradigm.30 
In this way, Kuhn’s conception of normal science is in stark contrast 
to Popper’s philosophy of falsification in which a negative result could 
individually undermine an entire theory.  According to Popper, scientists 
constantly engage in critical experiments that test the very foundations of 
their belief structure; their basic purpose was to disprove the underlying 
assumptions and embrace contradictory evidence.  To the contrary, Kuhn 
believed that scientists almost never ask fundamental questions, but merely 
accept the existing paradigm as a foundation for further research.  Kuhn 
provided the following example of an anomalous result being incorporated 
into the existing paradigm:  A scientist notices that while performing an 
experiment on cathode rays, a screen in his lab has an unexpected glow; 
further investigations of the anomalous glow then leads to the discovery of 
an unknown form of radiation called x-rays that were not predicted by the 
current paradigm.31 This scientist as well as other researchers then perform 
research on the x-rays and adjust the existing theories to reflect the new 
information.  Scientists can now predict the occurrence and effects of x-
rays.  What was once an anomalous result, is now a predictable part of the 
dominant paradigm. 
 
2. Paradigm shifts 
 
But Kuhn believed that when enough anomalous results accumulate, 
they can reach a critical mass that tips the balance of commonly accepted 
theories away from the predominant view and throws the field into a state of 
crisis.  When a field is in crisis, it no longer operates under a common set of 
beliefs, but instead resembles the immature state where scientists constantly 
need to restate their basic assumptions to communicate a new idea.32 In a 
time of crisis, scientists will begin retesting assumptions that had been 
 
29 Id. at 52. 
30 Id. at 52-53. 
31 Id. at 57. 
32 Id. at 72. 
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widely-accepted, and a new competing paradigm may slowly develop.  
Eventually, the believers in the new paradigm will challenge the hold-outs 
from the older system and the better system will prevail.  A better scientific 
paradigm is one that accounts for more of the known data and more 
accurately predicts future outcomes.  For example, in the late nineteenth 
century Newtonian physics and concepts of space failed to account for 
increasingly accurate measures of movement of celestial bodies.  
Astronomy’s inability to accurately predict celestial movement had pushed 
the field into a state of crisis.  This crisis only subsided with the publication 
of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity.  When the new standard 
prevailed, a “scientific revolution” or “paradigm shift” had taken place; 
Einstein’s relativity theory was a paradigm shift away from Newtonian 
physics. 
Kuhn’s philosophy has drawn its own criticisms, however.  First, his 
ideas are not useful to predict future paradigm shifts.33 One cannot say ex 
ante whether science is on the verge of a new paradigm shift.  And if a 
revolution does appear imminent, no one within the field is able to tell how 
much more information is necessary to complete the transition.  The 
difficulty in prediction arises because Kuhn’s idea is based on historical 
observations and can only be applied in an ex post position. 
Other critics have attacked Kuhn’s idea that two paradigms in the 
same field must be incommensurate, meaning scientists cannot hold to two 
different worldviews at the same time.34 Kuhn believed that physicists 
cannot simultaneously believe that Newton’s and Einstein’s theories are 
both correct.  The incommensurate component of Kuhn’s theory also 
implies that it is not possible to prove whether the field is better off for 
undergoing a revolution; the new paradigm may carry with it an entirely 
new definition for the science.35 Kuhn did not believe that there is a “true” 
scientific theory; merely that one theory may be a better predictor of future 
outcomes.  This concept has been given the disparaging label of 
“relativism.”36 Moreover, scientific discoveries do not actually develop in 
well-defined leaps.  Instead, they evolve slowly and at any given time many 
scientists may believe aspects of both old and new theories.  As even Kuhn 
 
33 Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the 
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 875, 885 (2002). 
34 See, e.g., Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, 47 Proceedings 
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 5-20 (1973 - 1974) (attacking 
the idea of conceptual relativism---the idea that reality is dependent on the framework with 
which it is viewed.  Davidson argues that supporters of a certain worldview can always 
discuss other worldviews, and thus it is incoherent to claim that two views are completely 
incommensurate). 
35 Larvor, supra note 10, at 42. 
36 Id. at 43. 
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noted, scientists do not generally believe that they are developing a new 
paradigm, but usually think they are simply building on established ideas. 
 
C.  Current Understandings in Philosophies of Science 
 
Philosophers have come to understand that theories do not stand by 
themselves, but actually rely on many supporting, or auxiliary theories.  
Any theory about the interaction between celestial objects, for example, is 
based on theories about gravity, inertia, mass, the make-up of the space 
around the objects, etc.  The success of any given theory therefore depends 
on the truth of its auxiliary theories.37 Therefore, a negative result from an 
experiment may indicate that a theory is false, but it could also mean that an 
auxiliary theory is incorrect.  Because a researcher confronting a negative 
result can never be certain whether the result reflects the theory being 
examined or a supporting concept, any particular theory is never fully 
confirmed. 
A key implication of this understanding is the importance of 
criticism in theory development.38 Because a theory can never be fully 
proven correct, criticism may be more useful than additional support.  A 
theory that describes all known events of a given phenomenon may not 
necessarily be correct; other examples that the theory could not describe 
may not yet have been discovered or a different theory may describe the 
events even better.  If scientists were to look only for more positive 
examples that are described by the theory, they would supply little new 
information for the field.    For example, Newton’s theories accurately 
described the data known at his time, but as more accurate observations 
were collected the theory’s flaws became apparent.  If instead of looking for 
supporting evidence, scientists attack a position critically they can rule out 
potential criticisms and choose which of competing theories best describe 
empirical evidence. 
Legal academics have developed a similar method of continuous 
critique and modification of theory.  What sets the legal academy apart from 
the sciences, however, is that the sciences have embraced the power of 
empirical tests to support debates about theories.  In contrast, law relies on 
criticism of theory in a more abstract sense.  This difference between law 
and other academic fields results, at least in part, on the difficulty of 
measuring legal concepts.  Physicists can use a ruler to measure the distance 
an object travels, anthropologists have developed sophisticated tests to 
measure the age of relics that they uncover, and chemists can use scales to 
weigh the product of a chemical reaction.  But lawyers do not have a tool 
 
37 Smith, supra note 19, at 397-98. 
38 W.B. Weimer, Notes on the Methodology of Scientific Research, 40 (1979).  
7-Sep-06] Legal Construct Validation 12 
that can measure civil liberties, security, or freedom.  Lawyers seeking to 
empirically test existing theory face the difficulty of figuring out what to 
measure. 
Fortunately, the complexities of measuring abstract concepts are not 
unique to law, and are common in the social sciences.  Psychology in 
particular has developed sophisticated methods with which to measure 
elusive notions such as when is a person actually depressed as opposed to 
just sad.  This subfield of psychology, called psychometrics, has developed 
over the last century to help researchers deal with the difficulty of treating 
concepts that are not easily quantifiable in a scientific manner. 
 
II. PSYCHOMETRICS 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the scientific world was 
still reacting to Darwin’s publication of On the Origin of Species by Means 
of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle 
for Life (commonly known as The Origin of Species).  Today, his theory of 
evolution proposed in the book is well-known.  But less well-known is that 
Darwin also concluded, based on this theory, that humans consisted of two 
subgroups---savages and civilized---and the distinction between the two 
was based at least in part on intelligence.  Although Darwin could conclude 
that some people must have advanced to a higher intellect than others, up to 
that point no one could empirically test that conclusion.39 The challenge of 
actually measuring a person’s intelligence intrigued many philosophers.  
The difficulty arose because raw intelligence was an abstract trait of a 
human mind and an obvious metric did not exist.  The philosophers 
eventually began testing other measurable traits that they believed would 
have some correlation to intelligence; even if it was not possible to directly 
measure how smart a person was, it was possible to estimate based on a set 
of related characteristics.  The first attempt at a test measured visual and 
auditory acuity and several other psychophysical variables.40 Although the 
specific metrics used in the first intelligence test turned out not to be very 
accurate, the idea of using measurable traits to estimate an immeasurable 
quality formed the basis of modern psychometrics. 
Researchers expounded on this early work by attempting to find 
characteristics with higher correlations to known indicators for intelligence, 
 
39 Unfortunately, Darwin’s conclusion that that intelligence was a genetic trait also led to 
misuse of the intelligence tests.  The eugenics movement was based on the belief that the 
quality of the human race could be improved by selective breeding based on the results of 
intelligence tests. 
40 John Rust & Susan Golombok, Modern Psychometrics, 5 (1999). 
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such as to students’ grades.41 By the end of the first decade of the twentieth 
century a consensus was achieved with regard to several testing techniques 
for measuring intelligence, and a test developed by Alfred Binet was 
practically applied for the first time to identify slower students in Paris 
schools for assignment in “special” classes.  Binet assembled a variety of 
testing criteria into a single test that was easy to administer, and teachers 
confirmed the accuracy of the test based on their own personal evaluations 
of their students.  The test was so effective that derivatives were used for 
over sixty years to help identify the mentally retarded.42 
A.  The Introduction of Construct Validation 
 
Since the 1950s, psychologists have been developing similar but 
more sophisticated tests with which to measure other unobservable 
phenomena, such as intelligence, depression, happiness, and other mental 
characteristics.  One of the key difficulties in assessing these traits, 
however, is determining whether the tests are in fact measuring the correct 
feature.  In 1955, psychologists Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl articulated 
the necessity of construct validity;43 validity is the degree to which a given 
test actually measures the trait, or construct, that it is intended to measure.  
They proscribed that “[c]onstruct validity must be investigated whenever no 
criterion or universe of content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the 
quality to be measured.”44 In other words, when faced with an abstract 
concept with no convenient metric, an investigator must first find a 
measurable criterion that can be used to approximate the concept.  But it is 
not enough to just find a single standard that may approximate the trait: it 
must also be valid, which means it should closely correlate with the 
construct being studied.45 
Because of the inherent difficulty in determining whether a given 
tangible criteria accurately reflects the value of the trait it is being used to 
 
41 Pearson developed the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient for analyzing 
the data. 
42 In the United States, a version of the test called the Stanford-Binet was widely used.  But 
because psychologists struggled for an adequate definition for intelligence, experts could 
not come to a consensus on what characteristics the tests were actually measuring.  A. 
Anatatasi, Psychological Testing, 5th ed. Macmillan, 67 (1982).  By the 1950s, many 
psychologists believed that the tests’ scores did not indicate anything more than the ability 
to perform well on the tests themselves. 
43 Lee J. Cronbach & Paul E. Meehl, Construct Validity in Psychological 
Tests, 52 Psychological Bulletin (1955), reprinted in Paul E. Meehl, Psyhcodiagnosis: 
Selected Papers 3 (1973).  Meehl actually considered himself a neo-Popperian. 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Id. at 3. 
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estimate, Cronbach and Meehl suggested that researchers “bootstrap” their 
way from a single criterion to achieve increasingly valid tests.46 Once a 
valid criterion is found, it can be used to develop more valid tests.  
Essentially, a test based on a valid criterion may become more accurate than 
even the original criterion itself.47 For example, people first recognized the 
physical quality of temperature because certain objects felt different than 
others, and they used the sense of touch to measure this characteristic.  But 
early observers did not yet fathom that this feeling could be accurately 
gauged or scientifically tested beyond simple feel.  Researchers eventually 
noticed, however, that when certain elements felt hot, they expand and 
when they felt cool they contracted.  Further, certain elements, such as 
mercury, went through significant noticeable expansion and contraction 
within the temperature range in which people lived.   And the expansion 
correlated well with the original test for temperature---feel.  Most 
important, though, was that the expansion correlated with not just one 
person’s judgment of temperature but with anyone’s perspective.  It turned 
out that mercury was an even more accurate gauge of certain temperature-
related events such as boiling and melting points than touch ever was.  In 
the end, scientists were able to use feel as a measurement for temperature to 
bootstrap a more valid test using mercury.  Similarly, Binet’s intelligence 
tests were accepted because their results correlated well with teachers’ 
expectations about their students’ intelligence.  In time, I.Q. tests were 
viewed as a more valid measurement for intelligence than teachers’ 
expectations.48 The validity of more sophisticated I.Q. tests could later be 
verified by comparing them to Binet’s test.  But as these examples 
demonstrate, a test---like a scientific theory---can never be proven 
completely valid, and establishing validity must be an ongoing process. 
It became apparent that like Popper’s philosophy of falsification, a 
vital component of construct validation is review and criticism.49 Without 
critical assessment, a measurement’s validity can never be confirmed 
because it would not be compared to other known indicators.  And when a 
metric cannot be tested through observable events, supporters may be 
tempted to rationalize its effectiveness.  Cronbach and Meehl warned 
however that “[r]ationalization is not construct validation;”50 researchers 
must develop hypotheses that critically test the measurement and a single 
hypothesis alone is not sufficient. 
 
46 Id. at  11. 
47 Id.. 
48 Id.
49 Id. at 17-18. 
50 Id. at 18. 
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B.  Modern Understandings of Construct Validation 
 
Using a method called the multi-trait multi-method approach, 
(“MTMM”) a researcher can further validate a metric by not only observing 
factors that should have positive correlations with the test, but also 
investigate factors that should be unrelated to the trait if the theory is 
correct.51 By using this approach, the validity of a test can be determined 
by measuring several traits---some that should have high correlations with 
the construct being studied and some that should not--- and by using several 
different methods.  This way a researcher can ensure that the results are an 
accurate reflection of the trait being studied and not a reflection of a related 
trait or an artifact from a particular experimental method.52 
To illustrate, consider a researcher who wants to assess a theory 
regarding mathematical reasoning and requires the use of a new test for 
math skills.53 To determine whether the new test is correctly measuring the 
proper traits, the researcher hypothesizes that the test is valid if the results 
correlate well with older, accepted tests.  But even though the researcher 
may be correct that a high correlation can indicate validity, this relationship 
alone is not definitive.  Without more information it is impossible to 
determine whether the test is truly measuring only math skills, or if an 
unrecognized third factor, such as reading skill, is actually influencing both 
the score on the old test and the new.  Hence the researcher must develop 
and test additional hypotheses regarding the possible influence that reading 
or other skills may have on the new test.  If further observations reveal that 
the test’s results have a high correlation with previous math scores, but an 
even higher correlation with previous reading scores, then the test is 
probably not a valid measure for mathematical reasoning alone.  Rather, the 
test may actually be measuring reading skills, and those people who are 
better able to read the problems may score higher than those with better 
math abilities simply due to a better understanding of the test.  But without 
critically exploring this alternate hypothesis, the researcher would have 
based future research on a potentially invalid test. 
If, after testing, the researcher discovers that the hypothesis is not 
supported, a reexamination of the overarching theory is necessary.  But this 
examination is not simple; scientific theories are often based on many 
auxiliary theories.54 Results can also be affected by elements of the test 
 
51 Smith, supra note 19, at 396; Rust & Golombok, supra note 40, at 73. 
52 Rust & Golombok, supra note 40, at 73. 
53 This example is derived from examples presented by Greg Smith.  See Smith, supra note 
19; see also Rust & Golombok, supra note 40. 
54 Meehl, supra note 8, at 20. 
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itself.55 Hence, when empirical observations do not conform to theoretical 
predictions, the negative results do not necessarily mean that the theory is 
wrong.56 Instead, it may be that the theory is correct and the test is not 
accurate.  On the other hand, it is possible that the test is accurate and the 
theory is not completely correct, that both the theory and the tests are not 
adequate, or that the auxiliary theories are wrong.  Unfortunately, because 
of these ambiguities, even if the hypothesis is supported, the researcher still 
cannot be completely confident in the theory.57 Once again, it is necessary 
to test the supporting theories in addition to testing the theory of interest.58 
When an experiment does confirm a hypothesis, the positive results 
can help establish the test’s validity, but Cronbach and Meehl originally 
claimed that the test cannot last in the face of negative results.59 In this 
way, their conception of construct validity resembles Popper’s theory of 
verification.60 But just as philosophers moved away from Popper’s 
justificationist view, psychologists have realized that tests are not fully 
invalidated in the face of negative information.  Rather, measurements must 
undergo constant revision.61 
To validate a test of a construct, psychologists can follow a five-step 
method.62 First, a theoretical construct, such as intelligence or happiness, 
should be specified.  Next, an informative hypothesis should be developed 
that will add to the knowledge of the field rather than reaffirming existing 
ideas.  Then research experiments can be designed that critically test the 
hypothesis and the data’s correlation with the hypothesis’s predictions can 
be calculated.  Finally, the theory should be revised to reflect the new 
knowledge gained from testing the hypothesis.  Under this method, theories 
constantly evolve to reflect the updated knowledge of the field. 
 
III. MEASURING UNOBSERVABLE LEGAL CONSTRUCTS 
Sciences that involve abstract concepts (in particular, the social 
sciences) share the common obstacle of measurement that is now 
confronting those wishing to approach legal questions scientifically.  But 
because this dilemma is common among many different fields, legal 
scholars are able to use the experiences from the other fields to overcome 
these issues.  This interdisciplinary approach is based on the idea of 
 
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Smith, supra note 19, at 396. 
58 Meehl, supra note 8, at  21. 
59 Cronbach & Meehl, supra note 43, at 18. 
60 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
61 Smith, supra note 19, at 396. 
62 Id.
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consilience, which is the “‘jumping together’ of knowledge by the linking 
of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common 
groundwork of explanation.”63 It is the idea that when one studies all levels 
of scientific phenomena, similar principles can be discerned; distinct fields 
of study may not be as discrepant as one might expect.  For example, one of 
the most prevalent of these similarities is that many fields decide among 
multiple possible explanations for a given outcomes by using Occam’s 
razor, which states the principle of parsimony; essentially, parsimony refers 
to a preference for the least complex explanation for a given outcome.  
Because of these underlying symmetries between fields (such as Occam’s 
razor) it is possible to solve some of the most complex problems in one 
field by integrating the knowledge from other disciplines.   
Accordingly, I propose extending the concept of construct validation 
from psychology to law.  Construct validity looks for convergence and 
divergence of operations to make inferences about latent variables based on 
measurable traits that are influenced by the construct.  For example, while 
happiness is unobservable, it is possible to measure happiness by measuring 
behaviors such as the number of times people smile or the frequency of 
complimentary statements.  Similarly, while deterrence may be an 
unobservable legal construct, it is possible to infer that a law has had a 
deterrent effect by measuring the frequency of unwanted behaviors or the 
number of arrests.  As mentioned in the introduction, however, it is 
important to remember that empirical observations should not be the sole 
basis for policy decisions.  Even if a supported theory predicts a certain 
outcome, lawmakers must still decide whether those laws comport with the 
societies qualitative values. 
The method I propose primarily involves four steps:  first, a 
researcher must develop generalized theories about the influence of law on 
society.  Generalized theories should predict behavioral outcomes that one 
would expect as the result of a given type of law.  Because unobservable 
legal constructs can only be empirically studied by noting divergent and 
convergent operations, a generalized theory should suggest as many 
different operations as possible; as more operations are tested, confidence in 
the presence of the latent variable should increase.  Second, based on the 
theory, the research must infer hypotheses that can challenge and provide 
useful information about the theory and specify operations to test 
hypotheses.  Although many legal empirical studies have devised and tested 
hypotheses, some do not, and even fewer test rival hypotheses or address 
possible weaknesses in an accepted theory.64 But, as explained above, 
experiments that simply reaffirm a hypothesis are much less informative 
 
63 Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge 8 (1998). 
64 Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 9, 37, 76-80. 
7-Sep-06] Legal Construct Validation 18 
than those that address criticism of the theory.65 Third, the researcher 
should design quasi-experiments that can infer causal relationships even 
when the subjects being studied cannot be randomized.  Finally, the original 
theory should be revised to incorporate inferences drawn from the new 
empirical information gained from the research.66 The remainder of this 
article will more fully develop each one of these steps. 
 
A.  Developing Generalized Theories 
 
The first step in measuring unobservable legal concepts is to 
develop a generalized theory that allows multiple inferences to be made 
about the unobservable construct.67 All theories are not created equal; that 
is, a hierarchy exists among theories in which some are more elemental and 
apply to specific situations, while other more generalized theories, involve 
concepts that can be tested under multiple conditions.  For instance, a 
researcher studying a new educational model could devise a basic elemental 
theory that a certain student will perform better on tests if the new model 
were in place because she has been receptive to similar educational models.  
Unfortunately, this theory provides little information because the results are 
very specific and is affected by the student’s particular characteristics.  
Hence, inferences that can be made about the quality of the program in a 
larger population are limited.  A more generalized theory addressing how 
the curriculum will affect the entire class becomes more interesting; it 
allows the researcher to asses the program using multiple operations, rather 
than a single test.  Hence, if a convergence of data occurs (namely, that a 
majority of the class improves after being subjected to the treatment), a 
stronger inference can be made about the quality of the program.  But the 
class may still have its own individual traits that can influence the results as 
well, and an even more generalized theory regarding the effect of the new 
educational model on the entire school can provide still more information.  
Similarly, generalized theories about law can provide the best information 
about the influences laws can have on a population by allowing more 
inferences to be drawn about the legal construct. 
Legal academics are skilled at developing and debating legal 
theories, but often the theories tend to be elemental, in that they are limited 
to the application of specific laws or concepts.  Professor Thomas Ulen has 
pointed out, however, that a common attribute in most sciences is that 
theories are universally applicable without regard to specific governmental 
 
65 Smith, supra note 19, at 396. 
66 These four steps are based closely on a five-step model developed by Greg Smith for 
construct validity research in psychology.  Id. at 399 
67 Ulen, supra note 33, at 897-99. 
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institutions.68 In addition to the multiple inferences that can be drawn from 
generalized theories, disciplines that rely on generalized theories also have 
the advantage of better communication and more focused study across 
boundaries; scholars are able to address common issues and share their 
findings without regard to their personal location.69 In economics, for 
example, researchers around the world share the same basic theoretical 
principles---such as the rational-actor theory---that allow their hypotheses to 
apply generally.70 Because economic research is often based on generalized 
theories, economists in India can share their research with Americans 
because both groups speak the same theoretical language.   
In contrast, law does not have accepted general theories that 
transcend political boundaries and form a theoretical paradigm within which 
legal researchers can more easily communicate across borders.  Rather, 
legal scholars focus on more elemental issues that affect their particular 
government.71 More productive theories, however, address generalized 
concepts that are amenable to empirical measurement because they allow 
researchers to use multiple techniques to explore the theory.  An empirical 
legal scholar studying an elemental theory about a single law passed in a 
small community can run only a limited number of experiments to explore 
the effects of the law.  For example, the community can be analyzed both 
before and after the law was passed or the community can be compared 
with similar communities that do not have the same law (experimental 
design will be discussed more thoroughly below).  In contrast, generalized 
theories about a class of laws allow multiple approaches for researchers: 
multiple communities with different laws within the class can be explored 
or the effect of that class of laws can be studied within the same 
community.  While these same experiments could be conducted without a 
generalized theory, they would progress in a state similar to what Kuhn 
described as an immature science in that they would lack cohesion that 
could provide focus for future study.  The theory could provide that 
cohesion and suggest potential follow-on research. 
 
68 Id. at 894. 
69 Id. at 894-99. 
70 Id. at 895.  Under the rational-choice model for human behavior, social scientists assume 
that people accurately determine the risks and benefits of their actions and act accordingly.  
Id. at 886.  This is the current paradigm within the social sciences and is the foundation for 
much of its current literature.  Id. at 886-87. 
71 Id. at 897. 
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1. Drawing international interest in interesting topics 
 
A general theory can draw more interest than an elemental theory, 
and can advance the current knowledge for the field more quickly and 
robustly.72 By developing theories that address interesting and widespread 
issues, they are more likely to draw commentary, which can foster a 
developing community for scholars to knowledgeably debate each others’ 
work.  This community of critical discussion is especially important in law, 
which lacks significant peer-reviewed journals.  In other fields, studies are 
vetted for publication by experts based on the quality of the research and the 
logic of the conclusions.  And despite calls for a change, law currently lacks 
this filter.  Hence, the only way under the current regime to ensure quality 
work is through discussion and debate.  If a study produces controversial 
results, others can evaluate the methods and comment on the conclusions.  
This way, well-executed studies can be celebrated and cited, while lower 
grade experiments will be undermined by criticism and eventually relegated 
to obscurity.  The best way to encourage the growth of these essential 
debates is for legal scholars to frame their theories in ways that are not 
limited to a specific statute or legal doctrine, but to question how the 
concept behind a law can result in observable behavioral alterations 
throughout a population. 
In contrast to science, the elemental theories often investigated in 
law rarely attract interest across national boundaries.73 While other social 
sciences benefit from diverse commentary from scholars internationally, 
legal debates tend to remain imprisoned within political boundaries.  
Professor Ulen argues that “there is no persuasive case for ‘legal 
exceptionalism’---i.e., for the view that law is inherently different from 
other academic disciplines that characterize themselves as scientific.”74 The 
obvious benefit from garnering increased attention beyond national 
boarders is that more people can provide useful commentary, insight, and 
critical analysis of an idea.  Legal experts in other countries may be able to 
provide differing perspectives on an issue and help provide a more nuanced 
view of the problem. 
Psychology Professor Greg Smith describes how the psychological 
theory of self-enhancement (the tendency to concentrate on one’s own 
strengths rather than weaknesses) was reworked based on information 
acquired through multicultural study.75 Initially, psychologists believed 
self-enhancement was universal, but cross-cultural testing showed that 
 
72 See Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 896-97. 
73 Ulen, supra note 33, at 895. 
74 Id. at 899. 
75 Smith, supra note 19, at 398. 
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inhabitants of some Asian cultures failed to demonstrate the trait.76 After 
further investigation, the researchers learned that members of these cultures 
did, in fact, self-enhance, but they exhibited the trait in a different manner: 
while members of individualistic cultures focused on individual behaviors, 
members of collectivist cultures placed  more weight on collectivist 
behaviors (e.g., defending decisions made by the group).77 The critical 
study of diverse cultures provided information that showed errors in the 
assumptions that supported the theory of the universality of self-
enhancement in ways that domestic studies could not.  The result of 
observing these varying conditions was a more detailed and complete 
understanding of the field. 
This example also illuminates the nature of auxiliary theories: 
general theories depend on the validity of auxiliary, or supporting, 
theories,78 and negative empirical data could be the consequence of faulty 
auxiliary theories rather than failures in the theory being examined.  
Theories that can be tested in other cultures can be used to undue this 
ambiguity by allowing international commentators to highlight the possible 
assumptions on which the theory is based.  But despite the benefits of cross-
cultural study, current legal research is limited almost exclusively to 
national issues and cases decided in United States courts.  And while that 
research is certainly beneficial, like the situation with self-enhancement in 
psychology, some commonly held beliefs in law may be misguided because 
they are based on particular American qualities. 
For example, most criminal law scholars agree that increasing 
mandatory prison sentences leads to decreasing unlawful behavior.  As a 
result, when legislators became concerned about the spread of crack 
cocaine, they increased the mandatory sentences for selling crack as 
compared to powder cocaine.  But it may be possible that Americans have a 
particular aversion to longer prison terms.  Although the possibility seems 
unlikely, in other communities the very idea of being sentenced to spend 
time in prison alone may be such a significant deterrent that a mandatory 
minimum ten year prison sentence will do little more than a one year 
sentence.  By performing cross-cultural studies examining the effect of 
longer prison terms on the sale of crack cocaine, researchers can determine 
whether the influence increased punishments have on unlawful behavior is a 
universal constant or if it is a particular cultural trait.  This knowledge can 
then inform decisions about future sentencing changes in the United States 
as well as other countries. 
 
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 I. Lakatos, Lectures on scientific method, in I. Latakos & P. Feyerabend (Eds.) For and 
Against Method 19-112) University of Chicago Press (1999). 
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2. An example in constitutional law 
 
The derivation and benefit of a generalized theory can be seen 
through an example posed by Judge Richard Posner, who suggested 
questions about constitutional law that he would like to see explored 
empirically.79 The first question he posited was “What difference has it 
made for press freedom and police practices in the United States compared 
to England that we have a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights and England 
does not (or at least did not, before it became subject to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)?”80 Any 
researcher attempting to empirically answer this question will quickly 
confront the difficulty in measuring “freedom of the press.”  As a first step 
in empirically answering this question, then, one could pose a generalized 
theory that countries with explicit constitutional guarantees tend to express 
freedoms more vibrantly than countries that have not made express 
constitutional rights.  Put this way, the question about the freedom of the 
press in the United States versus England becomes an elemental component 
of a more general question about constitutional law and its influence on 
societies. 
Posing a theory in such a broad manner is helpful for several 
reasons.  The first is the benefit gained from inviting a larger audience to 
comment.  In addition to attracting First Amendment experts to the issue, 
scholars in various aspects of constitutional law may also become engaged 
in the debate.  And as the study of this question draws more commentary, 
more ideas will be generated that help drive the field; critics may run tests 
in an attempt to undermine the theory, while supporters may try to replicate 
the outcome of a positive test or otherwise defend the theory.  In the end, a 
rigorous debate can develop with perspectives beyond the confines of First 
Amendment debate and the theory will become more refined and more 
accurate as empirical knowledge is acquired. 
Another significant benefit from addressing the elemental question 
about the First Amendment as part of a more generalized issue is attention 
from abroad.  Because the theory does not specifically address any one 
nation, legal scholars in other countries may have input as well.81 
International legal experts may have the ability and experience to bring 
nuanced insights to the theory in the same way that cross-cultural 
experiments allowed psychologists to refine their theories about self-
enhancement.  For instance, researchers may compare not only the United 
States and England, but also China, which specifically restricts speech and 
 
79 Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 156-57 (1999). 
80 Id. at 156. 
81 Ulen, supra note 33, at 895. 
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the press.  Analysis can also be done on certain Middle Eastern countries 
that allow only state run press organizations.  Perhaps, by empirically 
studying the varying relationships between governments and the local press 
(from constitutional freedoms to constitutional controls), scholars will be 
able to refine their understanding of the effects of constitutional rights in 
general. 
Finally, the generalized theory about constitutional rights can create 
a unifying concept that can draw together studies that would otherwise run 
without direction.  Studies of the Fourth Amendment’s protection from 
search and seizure can be compared to the First Amendment’s protection for 
the press.  Also, studies conducted in other countries that explore their 
particular constitutional system do not have to stand in isolation, but can be 
contrasted with their American counterparts.  And, like Kuhn’s paradigms 
for science, the generalized theory of constitutional rights will suggest 
future empirical legal work to progress the current understanding of 
constitutional rights. 
 
3. An example in intellectual property law 
 
Intellectual property (IP) provides an example of a law that is 
derived from generalized theories about incentives and rights, and has been 
extensively debated without regard to national borders.  The basis of 
intellectual property laws are generally attributed to one of two basic 
theories: natural rights or utilitarian.82 The theory of natural rights, 
developed during the Enlightenment, states that IP rights are an inherent 
part of the laws of nature---creators should own their creations.  In contrast, 
according to the utilitarian theory, IP is a legal right needed to provide an 
incentive for citizens to create; the public will forgo some of its ability to 
use new innovations by allowing its government to provide a limited 
monopoly right to creators, thereby providing a financial incentive for the 
creation.  Utilitarians believe that without IP law, innovations will not be 
utilized at their most efficient levels.  The American system of IP derived 
primarily from the utilitarian model, but debate continues as to the extent 
that the limited monopoly is necessary to drive invention. 
Many of the most recent modifications to copyright law in particular 
tend to provide increasing protections for creators.  For example, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) makes criminal tampering with 
effective encryption devises that protect copyrighted material, even if the 
encryption also prevents access to material that is not copyrighted or if the 
person wishing to gain access may intend a legitimate fair use of the 
 
82 Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright 
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copyrighted work.  The Supreme Court has also recently allowed a twenty-
year extension to the length of most copyrights.  Opponents of these laws 
have argued that these additional protections were unnecessary because the 
existing laws provided sufficient incentives for artists and other innovators. 
It is impossible to directly measure the “incentive” created by IP 
rights, but because of the generalized theories on which they are based it is 
possible to infer the degree the laws influence creation by empirically 
exploring the multiple traits that the incentives influence.  For example, 
because patent law has a standard duration for all inventions regardless of 
the development cycle of the product, it is possible to infer the influence of 
the law by comparing the frequency with which inventors patent in different 
industries.  In the pharmaceutical industry, for instance, the life cycle of a 
product often outlasts the life of the patent thereby decreasing the financial 
benefits that the innovator can obtain by exploiting their monopoly rights.  
But in the computer industry, new innovations become obsolete long before 
the monopoly rights expire, so the inventor can optimize their profit for the 
life of the product.  It is possible to compare the patenting practices in these 
two industries, in which IP law provides varying protection, to learn more 
about the actual incentives the law provides. 
Cross-cultural studies of intellectual property could provide similar 
benefits.  American IP laws are based largely on the belief that people are 
more willing to create if they receive a financial incentive for their work.  
But again, the fact that Americans seem to produce more when they are 
given stronger intellectual property rights may be a reflection of the 
country’s reliance on capitalism to reward positive behaviors.  In socialist 
societies, citizens may feel stronger motivations to innovate to provide 
greater benefits for the community, rather than for individual gain.  By 
studying the influences of intellectual property laws in other countries, 
researchers can gain a fuller understanding of these effects. 
 
B.  Infer multiple critical hypotheses  
 
Because generalized theories do not apply to single law, they allow 
researchers to infer multiple critical hypotheses to make more detailed 
inferences about an unobserved legal construct.  Latent variables cannot be 
determined from testing one hypothesis alone; they can be measured only 
after detecting trends of convergence and divergence of multiple operations 
conducted to test multiple hypotheses.83 As researchers accumulate 
evidence in support of a theory by testing the multiple hypotheses, 
 
83 Likewise, in similar situations econometricians assemble a set of several hypotheses that 
question multiple aspects of the subject.   
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confidence in the theory can increase.84 
As a concrete example, consider how astronomers study an 
unobservable singularity, commonly known as a black hole.  Singularities 
do not reflect light, radio, or other signals, so it is impossible to directly see 
or hear them.  But astronomers have still been able to examine several 
throughout the galaxy.  To do this, they first surmised the possibility of such 
celestial bodies based on theoretical considerations.  They then could 
deduce that if such a body existed with a strong gravitational pull, then 
observable objects in the surrounding area should be influenced.  
Astronomers were then able to scour the skies to look, not for the holes 
themselves, but for their effects on surrounding bodies.  When astronomers 
noticed that a star moved in an irregular pattern, they could hypothesize that 
the irregularity may have been caused by the gravitational force of an 
unobserved body---possibly a singularity.  But even if the influence is the 
singularity, it is still impossible to determine exactly where it is, how large 
it is, or how strong the gravitational pull.  If multiple observable bodies 
were affected in the same area, however, then it may be possible to 
“triangulate” details about the unobserved object without ever being able to 
detect it directly.  For instance, if orbits for several different objects were 
pulled in the same direction but at different severities, it may be possible to 
infer an approximate location for the singularity.  But, just as a theory can 
never be proven completely true, astronomers cannot truly confirm the 
existence of a singularity because it can never be directly observed. 
Unobserved legal constructs can similarly be inferred based on their 
influence on observable operations.  And while a single operation may 
indicate the possibility that the unobservable trait exists, only after testing 
multiple hypotheses is it possible to reliably triangulate the details.  
Moreover, by testing a larger number of hypotheses, more information 
about the unobservable trait can be gained.  For example, a generalized 
theory may state that capital punishment deters violent crime, and a 
researcher may infer the hypothesis that a state that employs the death 
penalty should have a lower rate of violent crime then one without it.  But 
just like a single irregular orbit does not provide enough information to 
study a singularity, the mere decrease in violent crime does not provide a 
full picture of the deterrent effect of certain punishments.  The crime rate 
may have been influenced by a third factor, such as an up-tick in the 
economy that created more jobs for the unemployed who may have 
otherwise resorted to violence.  Hence, to establish the validity of the 
deterrence theory, the researcher must also test hypotheses that economic or 
other factors influenced the crime rate.  And although the theory can never 
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be proven completely true, as more hypotheses are tested, the validity of the 
theory can become more certain. 
 But this example also demonstrates the necessity for critical 
hypotheses.  Because the deterrent value of capital punishment can never be 
completely established, a powerful set of hypotheses does more than simply 
reinforce a theory.  A hypothesis that, if proven, supports an existing theory 
can provide more confidence in that theory.  Conversely, a hypothesis 
designed to address criticism of the theory or help choose between 
competing theories can provide more valuable information; if such a critical 
hypothesis is supported based on statistical analyses, then the community 
learns that the theory may be false.  But if the hypothesis fails, critics have 
one less avenue through which to attack the theory.  Powerful hypotheses 
eliminate as many criticisms as possible, and a hypothesis that completely 
undermines a critique can provide the strongest possible evidence in support 
of the theory.  Hence, a powerful set of hypotheses for legal concepts will 
suggest experiments that can help rule out as many criticisms as possible.  
For example, with regards to the theory about deterrence, a researcher may 
test the hypothesis that economic conditions in a state with capital 
punishment are actually responsible for any difference in observed crime 
rate.  
 
1. Operationalization 
 
Before hypotheses can be tested, however, the legal constructs being 
examined must be defined.  Many terms have different meaning for 
different people; for instance, when in 1964 Justice Potter Stewart was 
called on to define obscenity under United States law, he famously wrote 
that he’ll know it when he sees it.85 But for an empirical legal scholar 
trying to study the effects of a new law or Supreme Court case on the 
amount of obscenity, a more useful definition is necessary.  A more 
functional definition for research may be that obscenity contains frontal 
nudity or explicit sex acts.  Based on this definition, anyone can determine 
if a film is obscene. While others may not necessarily agree with this 
definition, they will be able to understand and assess research that uses it.86 
Clearly defining a concept in a way that it can be measured, a 
 
85 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart J., concurring) (“under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-
core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I 
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture 
involved in this case is not that.”) 
86 Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences 25 (1998). 
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process called operationalization, is a vital component to quantitative 
science.87 Operational definitions are descriptions of variables or constructs 
in terms of the specific validation tests used to measure them, rather than in 
terms of an intrinsic essence.88 For example, weight may be defined as the 
result of putting an object on a scale and temperature may be defined as the 
reading on a thermometer.89 In psychology, mental retardation is 
operationally defined as a score of 70 or lower on an I.Q. test.90 Happiness 
can be defined in terms of facial expressions (such as smiling), tone of 
voice, and other observable characteristics; thus, if psychologists wish to 
measure whether certain treatment makes someone happy, they can count 
the number of times a person smiles in a given time-period after the 
treatment is administered. 
 Once a construct has been empirically studied, it may still be 
necessary to adjust the operational definition if the results do not correlate 
with expected operations.  For example, the term “genius” may be defined 
by a certain IQ score, but experts also expect geniuses to score well on 
achievement tests in school.  If studies were to find, however, that students 
with genius IQs performed poorly on achievement tests, then the term 
genius may have to be redefined using a measure other than IQ score.  In 
law, if obscenity was defined as the proportion of a film’s screen time 
devoted to showing nudity, but films that meet this definition of obscene do 
not also contain a higher than average number of sex acts, then the term 
obscenity may need to be redefined. 
Although law schools do not currently provide much training on 
how to analyze complicated statistical problems, lawyers are particularly 
trained in how to define difficult concepts.  When interpreting a statute, 
lawyers argue the meaning of particular words or concepts.  In applying 
judicial decisions, lawyers must determine how to apply the idea put forth 
in previous cases to the facts of a new problem.  The skills required to 
determine the precise definition of an ambiguous statute or the application 
of a complicated legal rule are similar to those required to define an abstract 
idea. 
 
2. Hypotheses for the constitutional rights example 
 
Turning back to Judge Posner’s question about the degree of liberty 
provided to the American press due to the First Amendment and our theory 
 
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) 41-43 (4th ed. 2000). 
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that freedoms explicitly proscribed in a constitution will provide more 
liberty, one notes immediately the difficulty in directly measuring the term 
“freedom”.  Although many scholars have debated the true meaning of the 
word freedom, empirical research requires an operational definition.  Hence, 
it is necessary to operationalize the term before hypotheses can be inferred 
to test the theory.  One possible definition for freedom of the press is the 
proportion of stories and editorials that are critical of the present 
government versus the overall number of stories published.  Conversely, in 
a country with less freedom of the press, reporters will be more reluctant to 
say anything negative about the presiding national rulers for fear of possible 
repercussions. 
Once freedom is defined by the number of unfavorable stories 
towards the government, hypotheses can be inferred to test the theory.  For 
example, one might hypothesize that the United States will exhibit more 
freedom than England because of the constitutional protections for the 
press.  Hence, to test the hypothesis an experiment might analyze the 
proportion of critical stories in the American press versus the British media.  
But just as a single irregular orbit is not sufficient to identify a singularity, 
this single hypothesis cannot support the theory alone.  To more completely 
test the theory, a researcher must develop several hypotheses that can 
eliminate potential criticisms and help choose between alternate theories.91 
For instance, a critic may point out that the proportion of critical stories 
may actually be a reflection of an unpopular regime or a general cultural 
attitude towards authority.  It is thus necessary to devise several hypotheses 
that can help establish the theory. 
A more complete set of hypotheses to test freedom of the press 
would include the one dealing with stories critical of the government, but 
may also include other hypotheses.  One hypothesis may be that any 
difference in disapproving reporting is the result of an unpopular 
government.  To test this hypothesis, a researcher may compare opinion 
polls or collect data from various time periods.  If this hypothesis proves 
false, then this criticism has been undermined and it is more likely that the 
press freedom is a result of constitutional protections.  Another hypothesis 
could be that any differences are actually caused by a more widespread 
social acceptance of criticism of the government; some societies may view 
critical analysis a positive trait for the press and will reward contrarian news 
outlets with increased readership regardless of the legal framework.   To test 
 
91 This idea is similar to that developed in econometrics by Haavelmo in The Probability 
Approach in Econometrics (1944).  He proposed that econometricians formulate a set of a
priori admissible hypotheses to address a given theory.  The set of hypotheses should be 
based on the existing on the theory at the time to help ensure that a proper hypothesis was 
included in the set. 
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this hypothesis, an experiment could be devised to survey different 
societies’ view of the proper role of the press and compare these results 
with the presence or absence of an explicit constitutional freedom or even 
the existence of laws limiting freedom of the press. 
The benefit of the more generalized theory about constitutional 
freedoms is that it will also allow comparisons between countries other than 
the United States and England.  Another way to test the theory then is to 
compare countries with constitutional rights similar to the First Amendment 
to countries not just with no explicit right, such as England, but also to 
countries with specific controls over the media, such as Iran.  Governments 
around the world exert varying degrees of control over their local media, 
and studies of press freedom in these different countries will provide a 
clearer and more complete picture of the influence of the First Amendment. 
 
3. Hypotheses for the intellectual property example 
 
A similar process can be used to infer hypotheses about the degree 
of incentives that intellectual property laws have over creation.  First an 
operational definition must be devised for the term “incentive”.  In this 
case, incentive can be the number of patents and copyrights that are issued 
either by governments’ patent or copyright offices.92 Because some 
countries do not have IP or equivalent offices, another definition for 
international study may be the number of creative products, such as books, 
CDs, or technological developments that are produced for the market.  
While critics may disagree with these definitions, they will still be able to 
understand and asses the research.  
After incentive has been defined, it is possible to infer a hypothesis 
to test the concept.  A first hypothesis could be that a longer duration of the 
limited monopoly protection provided by copyright law will provide more 
incentive to create; if IP laws provide incentives to create, then stronger IP 
laws should provide increased protection and thus more incentives.  One 
way to test this hypothesis is by comparing the numbers of copyrights 
sought before and after copyright protections were extended by twenty 
years in 1998 to include the life of the author plus 70 years.  But this test 
alone is not sufficient to support or undermine the theory.  Assuming the 
 
92 While trademarks are a form of intellectual property, and could potentially provide an 
incentive to create, they should not help define incentives because the justification for 
trademarks is not the same as that for other forms of intellectual property.  Copyrights and 
patents are designed to form limited monopoly rights for the IP rights holders.  In contrast, 
trademark law is designed to protect consumers from confusion between products.  Even 
though less consumer confusion may lead to a larger incentive to produce, it more 
attenuated that the direct benefits derived from copyrights and patents. 
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number of copyrights issued increased after the passage of the extension, 
other factors may have influenced the change; for example, the DMCA, 
which criminalizes decryption devises used to pirate copyrighted material, 
may have increased the value of the copyright independent of the change in 
duration, or the two laws may somehow interact to produce results that 
neither would have alone.  But even if the results show no change in the 
number of copyrights issued, those results are not definitive on their own.  It 
is possible that the incentive provided by copyright law maximizes at 50 
years after the author’s death so the extension had no overall effect even 
though other changes in duration would have changed the results. 
Hence, it is necessary to infer other critical hypotheses to test the 
theory.  For example, production of creative material can be compared 
between the United States and China, which does not have the same level of 
IP protection.  The generalized theory allows study in countries operating 
under various IP regimes to provide a more precise understanding of the 
incentives provided by the laws.  Other beneficial hypotheses may address 
areas in which people create without IP protection in an environment in 
which protections may be available.  For example, while academic journals 
sell their publications, the individual authors rarely receive a direct financial 
benefit from producing work.  Similarly, a recent study explored aspects of 
the fashion industry in which piracy of designs is common, yet designers 
rarely seem to enforce their IP rights.  
 
C.  Testing the hypothesis package 
 
Once a set of critical hypotheses have been inferred from the 
generalized theory, the hypotheses must be rigorously tested using 
appropriate research designs.  Application of proper experimental design to 
empirical legal scholarship has been debated extensively.  Although the 
details of research design are beyond the scope of this paper, for the sake of 
completeness this section will briefly outline some of the basic concepts. 
Empirical legal studies are generally conducted for three reasons: to 
collect data, to summarize data, or to make descriptive or causal 
inferences.93 Because the legal community performs many activities that 
produce huge amounts of raw statistical data, the mere collection of the data 
is useful; but researchers must compile and organize the information so it 
can be used for future analysis.94 Summarizing the data in a comprehensive 
but manageable format is also beneficial so the information can be 
understood quickly.  But the most beneficial purpose of empirical research 
is to draw causal inferences---that is, past outcomes can be used to infer 
 
93 Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 17. 
94 Id. at 23-24. 
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future results.95 Scholars can use information about the past to make two 
types of inferences about future events: descriptive inferences (predictions 
made about an entire population based on data gathered from a smaller 
sample set) and causal inferences (determinations of the factors that 
influence a given outcome).  A researcher may make a descriptive inference 
about future events after studying how the opening of a large factory affects 
a small nearby town.  The results can be used to surmise how other 
communities will deal with nuisance disputes in the future.96 A causal 
inference could be useful to determine whether affirmative action laws have 
been a contributing factor to any change in the number of black lawyers.97 
1. Quasi-experiments 
 
After the goal of a particular research project has been identified, an 
appropriate design can be selected.  A research design is the initial plans 
that provide the structure for the project and are generally categorized into 
three groups: true (or randomized) experimental designs, quasi-
experimental designs, and non-experimental designs.  Research using 
randomized experimental design (the gold-standard in research design) is 
used to establish whether a given treatment causes a specific effect: i.e., if X 
treatment is applied, then Y should result.  But to reinforce the analysis of 
the causal effect, the corollary must also be true: i.e., if X treatment is not 
applied, then Y should not result.  To make these parallel determinations, 
subjects from a common population are randomly assigned to either a 
treatment or a control group; subjects in the first group receive the 
treatment, whereas subject in the other group do not.  Because subjects are 
assigned to the two groups at random, they are assumed to be essentially the 
same, or equivalent.  A randomized experiment provides evidence in favor 
of a hypothesis when the predicted result occurs more often in the treatment 
group than the control.  These types of experiments have high internal 
validity; that is, the treatment employed was probably the cause of the effect 
observed. 
But because it is often inappropriate or impossible to randomly 
assign subjects to study legal concepts, empirical legal scholarship 
generally employs types of quasi-experiments, devised by Professors 
Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley.98 These designs resemble true 
 
95 Id. 29. 
96 See Gideon Parchmovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and 
Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 75 (2004). 
97 Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 34. 
98 Donald T. Campbell & Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs 
for Research (1963). 
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experiments, but without randomized assignment.  The lack of 
randomization means that quasi-experiments generally have lower internal 
validity than randomized experiments; it cannot be definitively determined 
whether an observed outcome was caused by the study’s treatment or by a 
threat to the validity caused by an unidentified influence present in one 
group but not the other.99 Hence, in all quasi-experiments it is important to 
identify possible threats to internal validity.100 
Researcher can control for threats to internal validity by utilizing 
one of three general strategies: relabeling, substitution, or elaboration.101 
Relabeling is used when the threat results from a mislabeled effect; that is, 
when the cause of an effect is attributed to the treatment when, in fact, it 
was influenced by a third factor.102 One way to cure this problem, 
therefore, is to just relabel the effect to better describe the true influences.103 
Substitution, the second strategy for ruling out a threat, is when a 
measurement that is subject to the threat is replaced by one that is not; for 
example, by using a randomized experiment rather than a non-randomized 
design to overcome selection bias.104 Finally, elaboration removes a threat 
to validity by adding additional comparisons to the experiment to try to 
disentangle the effect being observed from the threat.105 
Several different forms of quasi-experiments have been devised with 
differing threats to the internal validity.  Some of the most popular (and 
most valid forms) used in empirical legal scholarship involve 
“nonequivalent groups,”  in which intact groups, such as states, cities, 
 
99 The threats to validity arise from several forms of selection bias: history (some 
difference in the groups’ histories changes how they react to the treatment); maturation  
(the groups’ differ in their rate of maturation in relation to the treatment for reasons 
unrelated to the test); testing (somehow the pretest changed how the groups’ approached 
the posttest); instrumentation (other influences on one group versus the other between the 
pretest and posttest, such as different observers); regression (different rates of regression to 
the mean between the groups, such as when one group has more extreme pretest scores, so 
they have further to regress); selection (the subjects have difference from one group to the 
other); mortality (different dropout rates between the groups); and interactions between 
these biases and selection.  See Thomas D. Cook & Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-
Experimentation: Design & Analysis Issues for Field Settings 51, 52 (1979); Campbell & 
Stanley, supra note 98, at 5. 
100 Shadish, supra note 4, at 13, 16. 
101 Id. at 89, 90. 
102 Charles S. Reichardt, A Typology of Strategies for Ruling Out Threats to Validity, in 
Research Design: Donald Campbell’s Legacy 89, 91 (Leonard Bickman ed. 2000). 
103 Id. at 90-91. 
104 Id. at 92-93. 
105 Id. at 94.  Reichardt also describes five methods of elaboration: demonstrate that the 
threat has no actual effect; subtract the size of the effect from the results; vary the size of 
the treatment effect; vary the size of the threat effect; and vary the size of both the 
treatment and threat effects.  Id. at 95-108. 
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judicial jurisdictions, etc., are selected and presumed to be similar (but not 
equivalent as they would be if randomly assigned).106 The Interrupted 
Time-Series with Comparison Series (“Comparison Series”) approach 
compares similar groups both before and after a treatment, such as a new 
law or a new Supreme Court decision.107 If the two groups are substantially 
similar before the law is passed, and the observations being measured are 
the same pretreatment but diverge posttreatment, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the law affected the measurement.  Even so, plausible 
alternative explanations, such as a change in other local conditions or 
changes in other laws, should always be explored. 
Professors Albert Yoon’s and Tom Baker’s empirical analysis of the 
effects of a New Jersey offer-of-judgment court rule is a recent example of 
a Comparison Series research design.108 Under the New Jersey litigation 
rule that they studied, either party to a civil suit could offer a settlement to 
the opposing party; if the party receiving the offer refuses but goes on to 
lose the case, that party must pay all litigation expenses including attorney 
fees that were incurred after the offer was made.109 Originally the rule set a 
cap on the attorney fees at $750, but the cap was later removed in 
amendments to the statute.  The professors collected data from before and 
after the rule was revised to see if the increased cost-shifting associated 
with the amendment had an effect on settlement rates.  To fully analyze the 
effects of the rule, the study analyzed data from in-court trials as well as 
from out-of-court settlements.110 But because settlement information is 
usually not publicly available, Yoon and Baker arranged with a major 
American insurance company to use their confidential settlement data.111 
The study was designed so that the time period observed extended an equal 
duration before and after that change in law.112 The dataset also included 
information from five other states other than New Jersey to serve as the 
control group---these other states did not change their offer-of-judgment 
rules during this time period.113 Suits filed in New Jersey comprised nearly 
 
106 Social scientists use several different quasi-experimental designs: time-series, 
equivalent time-sample, equivalent material, nonequivalent control group, counterbalanced, 
separate-sample pretest-posttest, separate-sample pretest-posttest control group, multiple 
time-series, recurrent institutional cycle, and regression-discontinuity analysis.  See 
Campbell & Stanley, supra note 98, at 5 (describing various quasi-experimental designs). 
107 Campbell, supra note 3, at 201.  
108 Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-Of-Judgment Rules And Civil Litigation: An 
Empirical Study Of Automobile Insurance Litigation In The East, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 155 
(2006). 
109 New Jersey Court Rule 4:58. 
110 Yoon & Baker, supra note 108, at 159. 
111 Id. at 165. 
112 Id.
113 Id. at 166. 
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20% of the data that the insurance company supplied.114 The study 
concluded that removing the cap did not increase the number of settlements, 
but did decrease the average time to resolve a suit. 
Yoon and Baker approached the data using what they called an 
economic approach.115 If the researchers were able to run a randomized 
experiment, they would have randomly assigned subjects to control and 
treatment groups that were equivalent in every respect except for the 
variable being tested, in this case the cap on damages.  But because it was 
impossible to randomly assign citizens to either a city with or without the 
new rule, the researchers compared suits from a control group that consisted 
of states with similar demographics and size to suits from New Jersey (the 
treatment group).116 The control states did not have a change in their offer-
of-judgment rules, but the treatment state did.  In this way, the researchers 
made the quasi-experiment as close to a true experiment as possible by 
limiting the number of unexpected or exogenous factors that could 
influence the results. 
But Comparison Series design is only one type of quasi-experiment.  
Other variations may be more appropriate depending on the situational 
limitations, such as if only one group can be observed,117 or if only posttests 
can be conducted.118 Similarly, other designs can be used with various 
analytical strengths and weaknesses, and using them in combination can 
strengthen confidence in causal inferences.119 
2. Adopting research design to empirical legal scholarship 
 
Professors Epstein and King have proposed a method for empirical 
legal scholarship based on the existing methodological rules applied in the 
social sciences.120 They propose the following procedure for legal 
researchers: (1) develop research questions that contribute to existing 
knowledge and improve the real world; (2) formulate well-reasoned 
hypotheses about how societies will react if the theories are true; (3) bolster 
the theory by developing rival hypotheses that test the accuracy of the 
original theory; (4) use valid and reliable measurements used to test the 
hypotheses; and (5) select the appropriate observations to include in the 
study.121 They also suggest that the legal academy should adopt an 
 
114 Id. at 169. 
115 Id. at 172. 
116 Id. at 173-174. 
117 This design is called a One-Group Post-Test design. 
118 This design is called a Posttest-Only Design with Nonequivalent Groups. 
119 Cook & Campbell, supra note 99, at 103-46. 
120 Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 11. 
121 Id. at 54. 
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infrastructure that is more conducive to empirical work by offering more 
courses to teach law students how to properly conduct empirical research, 
train law professors about empirical techniques and provide more resources 
to use these skills, and create more expert review for empirical articles 
submitted to law reviews.122 
Professors Epstein and King also note the importance of articulating 
the methods used as precisely as possible.  An experiment does not provide 
any value to the field if readers cannot decipher how a test was performed; 
results alone are meaningless without an explanation of how they were 
achieved.  A test is useful when it rules out competing theories, but if it is 
not clear how a test is performed, hypotheses are not ruled out because 
readers cannot determine if the conclusions are based on the effects being 
studied or an unarticulated internal design flaw.  Negative tests results may 
be caused by an incorrect auxiliary theory rather than a failure of the theory 
being examined.  But if the methods are not clearly articulated, it is 
impossible to tell if the theory is wrong or if it is relying on a poor 
supporting hypothesis.  Essentially the author of a study that does not fully 
explain the method used is asking readers to simply trust the author without 
ever verifying the conclusions.   
 
3. Replicability 
 
A related reason to fully articulate the experimental methods is so 
the test can be repeated by others to determine whether the study measured 
a real event or if another factor may have influenced the outcome.  The 
results from a single experiment may reflect the phenomenon being studied 
but they also could reflect a chance outcome or a variable that the designer 
did not anticipate.  For example, study results that are based on survey 
questions may be influenced by the medium; survey results may differ 
depending on whether they were gathered online, over the telephone, or on 
paper.  More subtle details can also influence the data such as the color of 
the background or the text (participants in the study may have had a harder 
time reading light colored text against a light background).  But it cannot be 
determined from the single experiment alone if the results are a reflection of 
the variables being manipulated, random happenstance, or a third 
unaccounted for factor.  Hence, replication is essential.  As a study is 
replicated several times, researchers can have more confidence that the 
outcomes are the result of the variables being studied and not just a random 
occurrence.  But researchers wishing to repeat the study require detailed 
instructions to ensure their results are not influenced by other outside 
 
122 Id. at 114. 
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factors.  More general descriptions of methods are more prone to lead 
subsequent researchers astray. 
Professor Robert Thompson’s empirical analysis of courts’ 
willingness to pierce the corporate veil in corporate liability cases is an 
excellent example of a legal study with a detailed description of its 
methods.123 Because of the interest in the topic and general confidence in 
the results, this study has become well-cited and has been referenced by 
both trial and appellate courts in federal and state cases.  Thompson spends 
several pages of his article providing details about how he performed his 
research.  The article first described the Westlaw searches he conducted to 
collect the relevant court decisions.  He then explains that the original 
search results needed to be vetted to ensure that the cases that resulted from 
the search were actually related to corporate law.124 Finally, the article 
elucidates the specific information gleaned from each case.125 Overall, this 
description gives readers a detailed roadmap of the data collection process 
and how the results were analyzed. 
But to make this study more easily replicated, it would be helpful to 
add still more detail about the methods, in particular, how the cases were 
vetted to ensure they focused on the correct topic.  While the article 
precisely describes the specific searches conducted, it does not completely 
explain how the results were filtered.  It states that cases “that did not 
address corporate law” were eliminated from the study, but before 
subsequent researchers can replicate this study, they would still need to 
know how Thompson defined “corporate law,” and how it was determined 
what the case “addressed.”  The article does not explain whether his filter 
allowed only corporate liability actions or if it also counted insider-trading, 
antitrust, or litigation of other corporate laws.  The methods section states 
that Thompson’s research assistants made the final decisions about which 
cases to include in the study, but does not explain how they were instructed 
to make these decisions.  If an appendix had been included with the exact 
filtering instructions, future researchers would be able to more closely 
replicate the study. 
Unfortunately, even with this level of detail, follow-up studies may 
not arrive at the same results if the instructions allowed the assistants to 
exercise too much independent discretion to decide which cases to include; 
different readers may make different decisions about close cases.126  And 
without more information about the screening process, readers cannot 
 
123 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1036 (1991). 
124 Id. at 1044-47. 
125 Id. at 1044. 
126 Id. at 1044 n.48. 
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determine if the results may have been influenced by the way the cases were 
gathered.  Although this level of methodological detail may seem trivial, it 
can have profound effects on whether replication of the study will achieve 
the same results and ensure the reliability of the study’s conclusions.  As is 
clear in the next example, one solution for this problem is to allow 
subsequent researchers access to the final datasets.   
Yoon’s and Baker’s study (described above), also lacks an important 
element for replicability.  While using the information from a large 
insurance company seemed ideal because it is one of the few entities 
involved in many different lawsuits that also keep detailed information 
about the entire transaction, before allowing access to the data, the 
insurance company required that the researchers keep the company’s 
identity secret.127 So even though the methods were set out in detail (the 
article describes the exact information the insurance company provided, 
included a table that summarized the data that the insurance company 
provided, and described the specific statistical analyses performed)128 
because the dataset is confidential, subsequent investigators cannot attempt 
to replicate the study. 
The inability to replicate has several implications.  First, the study 
may have basic math errors that can not be checked.  Clearly Yoon and 
Baker thoroughly tested and retested their data, but if subsequent 
investigators wish to rely on this study for future experiments, they will not 
have the confidence gained from analyzing the data themselves or the 
ability to use different statistical analyses on the data.  For example, critics 
may wish to analyze some underlying assumptions on which the study is 
based.  Supporters of the research may wish to build on this research by 
performing even more sophisticated statistical analysis than the ones run in 
this study.  But currently law has not adopted an accepted norm to cope 
with confidential information.  Confidential data is a common problem in 
medical and psychological experiments because medical data is often 
collected from individuals, and these fields have developed way to address 
these problems.  Scientists have also developed methods of untying data 
from the individual from whom it was collected.  Although peer-reviewed 
journals in most fields will not publish an article if the data is not available 
to other researchers, the data must be anonymous.  This may involve 
assigning identification codes for each subject that only the original 
researcher can decipher. 
Legal scholars performing empirical work can develop similar 
requirements.  The subjects of a study, including corporations, should not 
be harmed by the experiment.  The legal academy should therefore try to 
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develop a system, possibly based on the systems used in other sciences, 
which can safeguard subjects of studies while still allowing future study of 
datasets. 
 
D.  Theory Modification 
 
Finally, once critical hypotheses of a generalized theory have been 
tested using appropriate research designs, the results should be used to 
modify the theory.  Construct validation is an iterative process, in which 
theories are modified based on the latest empirical research and then future 
research can be conducted to test the new theory.  Presently, however, 
empirical legal scholarship does not have a standardized system for 
incorporating new empirical data into existing theories.  The result is that 
evidence contrary to a popular theory may be ignored or the academy may 
just be slow to recognize the new data.  By incorporating new empirical 
data into generalized theories in a standardized manner, legal theories can 
evolve to become better predictors of behavior based on governmental 
policies. 
Some philosophers of science believe the ultimate goal of scientific 
research is to find the definitive truth about nature.129 Scientific research 
adds to our knowledge of the universe and, as science progresses, scientists 
come closer to the final truth.  In legal studies, the goal may not be an 
ultimate true law, but a more modest attempt to find the best possible set of 
laws to govern a given society at a given time.  Finding the best set of laws 
may then be accomplished by finding “true theories” about how law 
influences society.  These true theories can direct lawmakers about which 
laws to pass to correctly apply a policy. 
But, as noted above, empirical research should not be considered the 
final step in determining new policies.  The quantitative analysis should be 
used only to inform new policy decisions.  The generalized theories can be 
used to provide guidance when lawmakers approach new issues, but should 
not be used as the final solutions for problems. 
 
1. Incorporating empirical results into the theory of constitutional rights 
 
We have already considered a theory that explicit constitutional 
rights result in more freedom than if the rights were not included in a 
government’s foundational document.  We then inferred the hypothesis that 
if the theory is true, then the press should exhibit more freedom when in a 
country where it receives constitutional protections.  After running several 
 
129 See, e.g., Popper, supra note 7, at 50; Larvor, supra note 10, at 102; Smith, supra note 
19, at 400. 
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quasi-experiments testing this and rival theories, we are now faced with 
new empirical data that either supports, undermines, or alters the original 
theory.  We can now consider how to modify the theory based on the new 
information. 
If the data confirms the hypothesis and has ruled out several 
alternate theories, then the theory has been supported.  Although a theory 
can never be proven undisputedly true, the experimental results add 
confidence that it is accurate.  This theory can now be used to inform future 
policy considerations.  For example, if a nation was considering drafting a 
new constitution or new constitutional amendments, the drafters should be 
advised that if they include certain protections for citizens, the population is 
likely to act more “free” than if those protections are left to be set out in 
statutory provisions. 
But even in these circumstances, researchers should not rest on their 
laurels.  More research can still be conducted to further refine the theory or 
rule out other criticisms that had not yet been addressed.  In addition, the 
hypotheses discussed thus far have only addressed freedom of the press.  
Future research can address other constitutional rights, such as a right to 
privacy, a right to counsel in criminal proceedings, a right to due process, 
etc. 
If the experimental results undermine the validity of the theory, 
however, then the theory should be changed to reflect the negative data.  If 
the results show that the press does not exhibit more freedom despite the 
presence of constitutional protections, then researchers should consider 
several alternative explanations.  First, the operational definition of freedom 
may not have been correct.  Counting stories that criticize the government 
may not have been an accurate way to measure freedom.  Alternatively, it 
could be that the constitutional theory is correct, but the experiments relied 
on incorrect auxiliary theories.  For instance, it may be that the experiments 
relied on theories about statistical techniques that are not accurate in this 
context.  In any event, it is necessary to more fully explore the results and 
change the general theory to reflect the new data. 
Most likely, however, is that the data will provide inconclusive 
results.  The data may show that constitutional rights provide more freedom, 
but only with regard to certain rights or in certain cultures.  If a culture is 
intrinsically adverse to criticism of authority, protections for the press may 
not produce any change in behavior.  Similarly, a right for free speech may 
provide more robust results than a right not to quarter militia in one’s home.  
By exploring these possibilities, the theory will become more refined and 
provide a better understanding of the field. 
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2. Incorporating empirical results into the theory of intellectual property 
rights 
 
A similar procedure can be used to assess the generalized theory about 
the incentives provided by IP law.  If it turns out that stronger IP laws result 
in an increase in the number of copyrights and patents, then those results 
reinforce the theory that IP creates an incentive to create.  If, on the other 
hand, the experiments provide contrary results, then it is necessary to 
reassess the theory.  It may be that incentives should not be measured by the 
number of copyrights and patents issued, but rather by the number for 
which people apply.  Or, perhaps, it may be better to use several measurable 
indicators to get a fuller picture.  Negative results may also mean that the 
theory being studied relied on faulty auxiliary theories, such as financial 
gains are the only motivations that IP law provides or that creators desire.  
Finally, it may be that the theory itself is incorrect and that IP protections do 
not have an influence on innovations. 
 But again, it is most likely that the results show that the theory is 
partially correct, but needs refinement.  For instance, it may turn out that the 
motivation provided by IP law experiences diminishing returns.  That is, a 
certain level of protection will spur creation, but the marginal benefits 
decrease after a certain level of protection is provided. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By incorporating concepts of measurement developed in social sciences, 
empirical legal scholars can better assess the impact of the unobservable 
constructs that underlie modern legal theory.  Specifically, the notion of 
construct validation can be adopted from psychology to law to allow a 
standardized approach to the modification of legal theory to reflect updated 
understandings of how laws impact societies based on empirical 
observations.  These modified theories, which are based on quantitative 
observations, can then better inform policymakers’ qualitative decisions. 
